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According to Gilles Deleuze “cinema is Bergsonian.”1   Despite the fact that Henri 
Bergson critiques the cinematographic mechanism in his magnum opus Creative Evolution (on 
account of its movement being one applied to still images rather than being immanent to them), 
Deleuze correctly realized how central the moving image nonetheless was to Bergson’s 
philosophy. Yet this was already clear in Bergson’s own testimonies: “When I first saw the 
cinematograph I realized it could offer something new to philosophy. Indeed we could almost 
say that cinema is a model of consciousness itself. Going to the cinema turns out to be a 
philosophical experience.” 2  If Bergson’s relationship with the cinematic apparatus is 
ambivalent, (being a model of consciousness, but only in how it distorts the real), it remains to 
be seen in what manner his affirmative stance towards film should be understood.  In his 
positive account, Deleuze emphasizes the virtual image from Bergson’s earlier work, Matter 
and Memory, in order to show how movement is indeed immanent to the image, but only in 
virtue of its incorporeality. Such “virtualism” has been criticized elsewhere for its 
unBergsonian tenets.3 In what follows we will show how the cinematic body offers another 
way of rendering cinema Bergsonian. This more actualist Bergsonism is not pursued in order 
to be more faithful to Bergson, however, but to show how his ideas dovetail with modern 
corporeal, gestural readings of the film image.  When Dominique Chateau writes in Cinéma et 
philosophie that Bergson was the first major philosopher to take cinema as a model for 
philosophy, this is not only a historical thesis: his ideas remain pertinent to a range of 
contemporary approaches in film theory and place further weight on role of the body, not only 
for the experience of the spectator but also in the very nature of the moving image.4 
 
Something Infinitely Simple  
Amongst Jean Renoir’s various maxims concerning the creative process, probably the 
most renowned touches on a lack at the heart of such creativity: “A director makes only one 
movie in his life. Then he breaks it into pieces and makes it again.” Yet such repetition within 
creation need not lead us to doubt the possibility of novelty. This becomes clear when we look 
at another, cognate observation from Renoir’s fellow Frenchman, Henri Bergson, only this time 
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regarding philosophy. Discussing the “single point” that each philosopher makes throughout 
his or her whole career, he writes: 
In this point is something simple, infinitely simple, so extraordinarily simple that the 
philosopher has never succeeded in saying it. And that is why he went on talking all his 
life. He could not formulate what he had in mind without feeling himself obliged to 
correct his formula, then to correct his correction: thus, from theory to theory, correcting 
when he thought he was completing, what he has accomplished, by a complication 
which provoked more complication, by developments heaped upon developments, has 
been to convey with an increasing approximation the simplicity of his original intuition. 
All the complexity of his doctrine, which would go on ad infinitum, is therefore only 
the incommensurability between his simple intuition and the means at his disposal for 
expressing it. What is this intuition?5 
Coming from Bergson’s essay, “Philosophical Intuition,”  the first answer to his question—
what is intuition?—will arrive in the form of the philosophical “image,” a “mediating” image 
that is “almost matter in that it still allows itself to be seen, and almost mind in that it no longer 
allows itself to be touched.”6 Yet it is not, he assures us, to be confused with the virtual images 
discussed in his earlier work Matter and Memory, but something far more actual, more 
embodied (and yet still not a spatial, fixed, body): It is, Bergson writes, 
 
A receding and vanishing image, which haunts, unperceived perhaps, the mind of the 
philosopher, which follows him like his shadow through the ins and outs of his thought 
and which, if it is not the intuition itself, approaches it much more closely than the 
conceptual expression, of necessity symbolical, to which the intuition must have 
recourse in order to furnish “explanation.” Let us look closely at this shadow: by doing 
so we shall divine the attitude of the body which projects it. And if we try to imitate this 
attitude, or better still to assume it ourselves, we shall see as far as it is possible what 
the philosopher saw.7 
 
Deleuze, we know, made much of the virtual images of Matter and Memory in his two Cinema 
books, transforming a psycho-meta-physical thesis into an ontological one (thereby 
disregarding Bergson’s own anti-ontological stance) while also distorting Bergson’s negative 
view of the cinematic apparatus (in Creative Evolution) into a positive view of cinema editing. 
In this essay, we will instead be pursuing this “attitude of the body” that projects the vanishing 
but singular image of philosophical intuition. And we will do so through an analogy with the 
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idea of “one” (image or idea) that underpins a film. This will be an attempt, therefore, to 
generate or project a film of intuition—to assume (or suggest) the (film) image of 
(philosophical) intuition (rather than simply one more philosophy of film).8 After all, even in 
Matter and Memory, the image is described ardently as something that is not a picture (“to 
picture is not to remember”), and the brain is portrayed as an organ of mime. The brain does 
not represent (an idea, or a picture); rather, it performs its images through its own equivalent 
of an actor’s “gestures and attitudes.”9 It is this performed, bodily cinema that we will examine, 
both through what Bergson has to say about gesture, and through a gestural concept enacted 
by a film, to be precise, Lars von Trier’s The Five Obstructions (2003).  
This will also bring us back to the idea of what it is that is being remade, both by 
directors and philosophers, in Renoir’s “one film” and Bergson’s singular “vanishing image.”  
The Five Obstructions is comprised of five remakes of an original work by another film-maker, 
Jørgen Leth. Leth, a mentor of von Trier, is instructed by von Trier to remake five sequences 
from his own 1967 short film, The Perfect Human (a pseudo-anthropological study of human 
behaviour). Each remake comes with an obstruction or “creative constraint.” The constraints 
are as follows: 1. that it be remade with no shot longer than 12 frames; 2. that it be remade in 
the most miserable place on earth; 3. that it be remade with no constraint at all (a form of meta-
obstruction of total freedom); 4. that it be remade as a cartoon (the definition of a non-film for 
both von Trier and Leth); and finally, 5. that von Trier makes the fifth remake, though it must 
be both credited to and narrated by Leth.  
As such, one way of reading The Five Obstructions is precisely as an enactment of 
Renoir’s adage—that each film-maker only makes one film, again and again—with von Trier 
forcing Leth to recompose The Perfect Human repeatedly following certain constraints. Such 
forms of experimentation in film are not unique, however. In 1998 Gus Van Sant directed a 
shot-by-shot remake of Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 classic horror film, Psycho. While the new 
film was in colour, rather than the original’s black and white, and was set in a contemporary 
era with a new cast, it otherwise retained nearly all of the first film’s audio-visual structure – 
including Bernard Hermann’s score.10 Indeed, such was its fidelity to the 1960 film that some 
critics dubbed it a (rather pointless) “duplicate” rather than a remake.11 A duplicate like this, 
presumably, would lie somewhere between a mere re-mastered print of the original and a true 
remake. But if a remake is to be more than a duplicate, then what exactly is being remade (if it 
is not an audio-visual structure)? In answer to why Van Sant’s audio-visual replica of the 
structure of Psycho was deemed such a failure we will propose that the sheer repetition of such 
structures is never invention. Rather, what is remade – but with novelty – is never a fixed image 
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or sound, a propositional state or story. And this is the (Bergsonian) conjecture we will pursue: 
that what is remade (by philosopher or director) is not a picture but a posture—a bodily stance 
or “attitude.” It is this gestural recreation that allows novelty and repetition to coexist.  
  
Bergsonian Re-orientations 
One basis for Bergson’s re-orientation (from picturing to posturing) in Matter and 
Memory and beyond can be gleaned from the description of intuition offered in his 1903 essay, 
“Introduction to Metaphysics.” Here, Bergson outlines the famous contrast between creative 
intuition and the “ready-made” concepts of “analysis”: “To try a concept on an object is to ask 
of the object what we have to do with it, what it can do for us. To label an object with a concept 
is to tell in precise terms the kind of action or attitude the object is to suggest to us.”12 Bergson’s 
corporealist stance is already indicated in this use of terms such as “attitude” and it is ability to 
“suggest”: attitudine, “fitness, posture;” and suggerere, “bring from below,” from “gesture” or 
gerere, to “bear, wield, perform.” And both are linked to Bergson’s most renowned formulation 
of intuition that comes in the same essay: thinking in duration means “to reverse the normal 
direction of the workings of thought.”13 Few philosophers have argued anything so heretical as 
we find in Bergson’s approach to metaphysics, that is, a radical reversal of what we think 
metaphysics (and philosophy) to be and how we think it operates (in an “anti-Kantian” 
metaphysics of immanence, as Quentin Meillassoux describes Bergson’s method).14 More than 
this, it leads us to a redirection of where thinking is supposed to take place: thinking changes 
source and direction, passing from things to concepts, and not from concepts to things. 
Bergson’s idea is not that we merely change the direction of our thought about things (whatever 
that might mean), but that metaphysical thinking somehow starts with the object too, at least 
as an orientation, posture, or attitude.  This is his call to re-orient or reverse our stance: the 
inversion of the work of the mind is not intellectualist, but behavioural in attitude. 
At an even more most abstract level, this postural aspect of Bergson’s thought engages 
with the theory of images in Matter and Memory. Let us recall the basics of the imagology in 
its first chapter where what we perceive is only what interests us (and our bodies) at any 
moment:  
 
To the degree that my horizon widens, the images which surround me seem to be 
painted upon a more uniform background and become to me more indifferent. The more 
I narrow this horizon, the more the objects which it circumscribes space themselves out 
distinctly according to the greater or lesser ease with which my body can touch and 
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move them. They send back [renvoient, “return”], then, to my body, as would a mirror, 
its eventual influence; they take rank in an order corresponding to the growing or 
decreasing powers of my body. The objects which surround my body reflect its possible 
action upon them.15 
 
There is a “background” that re-turns to my body only what interests it, so that even “distance” 
itself takes on an axiological form, representing “above all, the measure in which surrounding 
bodies are insured, in some way, against the immediate action of my body.”16 My body is 
simply “an object”, but one capable of performing a “new action” upon surrounding objects, 
and this ability to act anew is what marks out its “privileged position” in regard to other, 
background objects. Hence, to undo what the body instigates, to reverse this “narrow” attitude, 
is to look again in detail (in higher-definition) and in close-up at this background: it requires a 
reversal of orientation.  
Indeed, in Matter and Memory even memory, apparently the most virtual element of 
Bergson’s thought, is tied to bodily stance: 
 
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, 
we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the 
present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region 
of the past—a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera. But our 
recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting 
the appropriate attitude.17 
 
If this seems to go too far – especially given Bergson’s purportedly disembodied “spiritualist” 
tendencies – then the following description of education from the introduction to The Creative 
Mind may help to confirm this revision of his work. Here he argues that, to understand a text, 
a student  
 
Must fall into step with him [the author] by adopting his gestures, his attitudes, his gait, 
by which I mean learning to read the text aloud with the proper intonation and inflection. 
The intelligence will later add shades of meaning. Before intellection properly so-
called, there is the perception of structure and movement; there is, on the page one 
reads, punctuation and rhythm. Now it is in indicating this structure and rhythm, in 
taking into consideration the temporal relations between the various sentences of the 
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paragraph and the various parts of each sentence, in following uninterruptedly the 
crescendo of thought and feeling to the point musically indicated as the culminating 
point that the art of diction consists.  […] One knows, one understands only what one 
can in some measure reinvent.18 
 
Reinvention is not the repetition of fixed structures but “structure and rhythm” – movement or 
gesture. In the footnote that follows this passage, Bergson goes even further in this gestural 
comprehension of comprehension, arguing that “rhythm roughly outlines the meaning of the 
sentence truly written, that it can give us direct communication with the writer’s thought before 
study of the words has given them color and shading.”19 In one lecture at the Collège de France 
on Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode, he tells us that he took some pages of the text as an 
example “to show how the comings and goings of thought, each in a particular direction, pass 
from the mind of Descartes to our own solely by the effect of the rhythm as indicated by the 
punctuation, and especially as brought out by reading it aloud correctly.”20 This footnote then 
refers the reader to Bergson’s 1912 lecture “The Soul and the Body” where thinking is 
vectorised in a clearly behaviourist manner, albeit also being internalised as a tendency, 
“nascent” and “performed in the brain”: 
Consider thinking itself; you will find directions rather than states, and you will see that 
thinking is essentially a continual and continuous change of inward direction, 
incessantly tending to translate itself by changes of outward direction, I mean by actions 
and gestures capable of outlining in space and of expressing metaphorically, as it were, 
the comings and goings of the mind. Of these movements, sketched out or even simply 
prepared, we are most often unaware, because we have no interest in knowing them; 
but we have to notice them when we try to seize hold of our thought in order to grasp it 
all living and make it pass, still living, into the soul of another. The words may then 
have been well chosen, but they will not convey the whole of what we wish to make 
them say if we do not succeed by the rhythm, by the punctuation, by the relative lengths 
of the sentences and part of the sentences, by a particular dancing of the sentence, in 
making the reader’s mind, continually guided by a series of nascent movements, 
describe a curve of thought and feeling analogous to that we ourselves described. […] 
The rhythm speech has here, then, no other object than that of choosing the rhythm of 
the thought: and what can the rhythm of the thought be but the rhythm of the scarcely 
conscious nascent movements which accompany it? These movements, by which 
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thought continually tends to externalize itself in actions, are clearly prepared and, as it 
were, performed in the brain.21 
Here we have a kind of micro-behaviourism of the brain as well as the macro-behaviourism of 
bodies in relation – one that would short-cut the traditional disputes between “central state” 
materialists and logical behaviourists by rendering behaviour neurological while also 
upgrading cerebral motor-mechanisms to something more than just mechanical movements. If 
the brain does “control” behaviour, it is because it too is behaviour. 
 
Gestural Cinema   
Of course, explicitly behavioural analyses in cinema theory are not unusual either, 
though few can be as radical as that of Giorgio Agamben, for whom it is gesture, rather than 
the image, which is the fundamental filmic property. His short essay, “The Six Most Beautiful 
Minutes in the History of Cinema”, for example, discusses a sequence from Orson Welles’s 
unfinished Don Quixote in terms of gesture:  
 
Sancho Panza enters a cinema in a provincial city. He is looking for Don Quixote and 
finds him sitting off to the side, staring at the screen. The theater is almost full; the 
balcony - which is a sort of giant terrace - is packed with raucous children. After several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach Don Quixote, Sancho reluctantly sits down in one of the 
lower seats, next to a little girl (Dulcinea?), who offers him a lollipop. The screening 
has begun; it is a costume film: on the screen, knights in armor are riding along. 
Suddenly, a woman appears; she is in danger. Don Quixote abruptly rises, unsheaths 
his sword, rushes toward the screen, and, with several lunges, begins to shred the cloth. 
The woman and the knights are still visible on the screen, but the black slash opened by 
Don Quixote’s sword grows ever larger, implacably devouring the images. In the end, 
nothing is left of the screen, and only the wooden structure supporting it remains 
visible.22 
 
Quixote’s gesture destroys the cinema image, and, likewise, Agamben claims that gesture is 
the quintessential cinematic element, replacing the photograph as its fundamental unit: 
 
The mythical rigidity of the image has been broken and that here, properly speaking, 
there are no images but only gestures. Every image, in fact, is animated by an antinomic 
polarity: on the one hand, images are the reification and obliteration of a gesture (it is 
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the imago as death mask or as symbol); on the other hand, they preserve the dynamis 
intact.23 
 
 
Agamben’s analyses of cinema indicate a nostalgia for “the homeland of gesture.”24 But they 
are also a political and ethical call for a future cinema that reconfigures the relationship between 
image and gesture. For him, the moving image as gesture has the power to liberate the 
cinematic from the last traces of a static image. 
Despite his focus upon gesture, we will not follow Agamben any further here even if, 
in one respect, we stay true to his line (which itself follows Foucault) that what we call 
“gesture” is only “what remains unexpressed in each expressive act” and “the exhibition of a 
mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such.”25 Indeed, one of Bergson’s most 
notorious demands for philosophy is that it should seek a means to know the Real without any 
“expression, translation or symbolic representation.” 26  And for Bergson, intuitive 
“metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, therefore, is the science which claims to dispense 
with symbols.”27 And yet we know that when Bergson describes a metaphysics that would 
dispense with symbols, it is really a question of what type of symbolism is at stake, fluid or 
fixed, suggestive or direct, bespoke or ready-made, and not the symbolic tout court. A 
philosophy-without-symbols is really a philosophy-without-standard-symbols, therefore, and 
is practiced without fixed representations (be they linguistic, conceptual, or photographic). It 
begins, he says, with images that gesture toward (suggest) an intuition. Images direct us 
towards intuitions, they do not stand for (represent) intuitions. 
 
Unconstrained Style: Behaviourism in The Five Obstructions 
Earlier, I described Von Trier’s The Five Obstructions as a work whose very form 
explores a number of issues concerning aesthetic creativity and generative constraint. The third 
of the five constraints was also a meta-level one, involving no constraint at all – complete 
artistic freedom. For a film-maker in the realist tradition like Leth, however, this was a definite 
imposition. The perversity arises because Leth initially asks for an alternative constraint 
whereby von Tier would provide a new set of obstructions for him to endure: as he says, “I 
prefer you to make the decisions.” Yet, precisely because that would be Leth’s preference, von 
Trier decrees that it is Leth who must make all the decisions in absolute freedom for this third 
remake. So, why is such total freedom an imposition for Leth (beyond the usual 
psychoanalytic/existential responses concerning the intolerable burden of personal 
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responsibility)? It is simply because von Trier shares with Leth the idea that constraints are 
crucial for creativity in film-making, such that imposing a free-style film on his former teacher 
can only be – as Mette Hjort puts it – “a straightforward negation of Leth’s characteristic 
approach.”28  
We must note here that Leth’s model of optical film-realism involves patience, that is, 
a certain kind of passivity:  
 
I normally find places and then isolate something I want to examine. That’s the method. 
And then I frame it very precisely and wait for the right moment. I believe very strongly 
in waiting and observing.29  
 
Leth allows the moment to be captured to present itself – to let the randomness of the Real take 
its course. Admittedly, it is he who selects the “decisive moment” to record (to borrow one of 
Cartier-Bresson’s terms), but its emergence is spontaneous. Let us say that it belongs to the 
Real (or Real Time, as Bergson would call it). Ordering Leth to make any film he wishes in 
the third obstruction is actually an imposition of sorts: less the burden of responsibility than 
the burden of creativity. Leth’s natural preference is to let the Real offer up the “concrete 
instants” that he will passively record, rather than that he conduct all affairs. Forcing all of the 
decision-making process onto Leth actually removes his artistic freedom, oddly enough.  
Naturally, Leth is free to escape from his freedom, in this third film at least, by reverting to his 
usual long-take realist aesthetic. And yet, this is not what he does. Instead, he offers up a highly 
stylised, rather formal piece, using split screens, cryptic monologues, and quite clichéd “art-
house” imagery (a mysterious man and woman, sexual encounters in expensive hotel rooms, a 
sense of political or criminal intrigue, slow-moving limousines, clandestine meetings in rainy, 
desolate locations, and so on).  
Earlier, I alluded to the pseudo-anthropological approach in The Perfect Human in its 
original form. The narration of the third remake (in English), compounds this impression even 
further: 
 
Here’s the man. Here he is. What’s he want?  
Here’s the woman. Here she is. What does she want?  
Here’s a man. We don’t know him. I don’t know what to say about him. We love that he 
is special, unreasonable. A distant look, a loss of soul, a distant look.  
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I would like to know something more about him. I can see that he is here, and that he 
works. I have seen him smoke a cigarette. I didn’t see him write. Is he good at describing 
death? Does he think about fucking? He is alone, preparing himself. He goes out and 
takes care of things. He’s the perfect man. 
 
In this and other sequences the question as to what the man is thinking is reiterated, but never 
answered. All we are given are external details, visuals of movement – of smoking, of shaving, 
of waiting. Alongside this unanswered enquiry comes the peculiar mannerism of this version, 
with a certain “type” of art-house cinema being replicated throughout. Paramount in this, 
however, is the acting role of the male protagonist. Leth casts Patrick Bauchau to play “the 
man” (Claus Nissen’s role in the original) almost entirely because of his presence and style. 
Murray Smith remarks on this as follows: 
 
The casting of Patrick Bauchau in #3: Brussels, for example, [was] inspired by Leth’s 
admiration for his performance as the protagonist of Eric Rohmer’s La collectionneuse. 
Intriguingly, Rohmer’s film was, like The Perfect Human, released in 1967; it as if Leth 
has chosen a better-known counterpart to Claus Nissen –  an equally handsome actor 
from the same generation, both born in 1938 – in order to stress the effects of time and 
experience on the model-like “perfection” of the figures in his original film (Leth notes 
the importance of Bauchau’s “well-bruised” quality to his casting in #3: Brussels).30 
 
Nonetheless, it is not as if Bauchau is given much to do by Leth in this film, for he mostly 
poses in rooms, has little dialogue and even less interaction with other actors. He is there 
because of his “look.” Leth is obviously delighted with his casting, stating that he is “…really 
pleased with him. He looks great. […] He is well ... well bruised as a person. He has experience 
of life. He has lived a life. His story is fantastic.”31 Bauchau, then, stands for a certain type and 
remakes the Claus Nissen protagonist through a distinctive acting style, almost bordering on 
non-acting: he is a man who “takes care of things” just by looking like such a man. Indeed, of 
all six films, the original and the third versions of The Perfect Human place the most emphasis 
on acting style (as opposed to editing in One, location in Two, animation in Four, and 
performativity in Five).32 And it is Murray Smith, once more, who finds the right idea on this 
front when describing the original The Perfect Human:  
The Perfect Human is an enigmatic, spare narrative film, depicting a man and a woman 
engaged in various generic activities – eating, dancing, undressing, shaving – mostly in 
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isolation from one another. […] The setting of the film is abstract in the extreme: the performers 
are afforded certain minimal props (a razor, a bed, a dining table) but the space behind them is 
so overexposed as to lead the eye into a white void. The man and the woman are beautiful, 
young, chic; much of the time they are doing little more than striking poses in the featureless 
zone that they occupy.33 
It is possible to read The Five Obstructions as a reflection on difference and repetition 
in film-making, with von Trier forcing Leth to recompose The Perfect Human repeatedly 
following certain constraints. But the obstructions to each remake nonetheless ensure a creative 
reproduction, rather than a faithful replica. This has been accounted for partly through the use 
of constant stylistic innovation. As von Trier writes of his own work:  
 
you can become so good at producing things that they become nauseatingly boring to 
look at. That might have happened had I continued to make the same film again and 
again, as some people do.34   
 
Von Trier is known for not repeating himself, at least stylistically – switching genres and 
aesthetics (realism, magic realism, documentary, theatricality, abstraction) at every 
opportunity. Yet, von Trier insists on a partial repetition in each task given to Leth, albeit that 
the added obstructions guarantee a certain creativity in style. Mette Hjort comments on this, 
saying that “the commitment [to renewing styles] throughout, it transpires, is to a form of self-
provocation that involves abandoning the cinematic techniques as they are mastered in favour 
of new challenges.” 35  Hence, we should interpret the qualification above, “at least 
stylistically”, in such a way that the issue of style becomes a highly significant approach.  As 
Smith also writes, “In The Five Obstructions the game of style is narrativised; the variations in 
style have an overt motivation in the narrative contest recounted by the film. Even so, the 
variations are not motivated in the traditional manner as apt stylistic expressions of theme.”36 
In the opening obstruction, set in Cuba, a certain behavioural attitude is also assumed. Adopting 
the same pseudo-anthropological pose as its original, this The Perfect Human also asks 
questions such as “What is the perfect human thinking? Is he thinking about happiness? Death? 
Love?” And yet the answers eventually provided to these and other questions often appear to 
be pseudo-answers, at least for those who are looking for sufficient reasons. Paisley Livingston 
describes the situation thus: 
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The response to the question: “Why does he move this way?” is a comical flaunting of 
Trier’s injunction to answer the questions raised by the narrator of The Perfect Human; 
the proposed answer (“Because women like it”) does not really answer the question, 
while seeming to do so in a blunt way; all the other questions remain willfully 
unanswered in the remake, which reinforces the thought that Leth has cleverly slipped 
past this obstruction.37 
 
However, I would want respond to Livingston that questions such as “what is he thinking?” or 
those concerning the character’s motivations are indeed answered, only through external 
behaviour or style of movement. The film takes an externalist approach to questions of 
putatively inner motivation. It is a filmic behavourism. Hjort adds to this point about acting 
and style by referring to Arthur Danto’s claim, in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 
that “style is a gift” (it cannot be directed), and expresses individual “‘ways of seeing the 
world’.”38 Danto himself goes even further, arguing that “style is the man.” When someone 
paints in the style of Rembrandt, for example, “he has adopted a manner, and to at least that 
degree he is not immanent in the painting in the way Rembrandt is.”39All the same,  
 
the language of immanence is made licit by the identity of the man himself and his style 
– he is his style – and by transitivity of identity Rembrandt is his paintings considered 
in the perspective of style. […] What, really, is “the man himself”? I have argued a 
theory to the effect that we are systems of representations, ways of seeing the world, 
representations incarnate.40 
 
In Leth’s films of The Perfect Human, consequently, we could say that it is the human – who 
may be an actor or the director in the strict sense, but always a performer in the broad sense – 
who is these “representations incarnate”, this way of seeing. And it is also a way of answering, 
a way of reasoning without identifiably philosophical forms of rationality. One might say that 
they are behavioural and cinematic explanations.  
All in all, then, be it through this externalization of ideas, the behaviourist and 
anthropological approach adopted, or the role of the actor/director as a type of performer, this 
third version of The Perfect Human partly enacts the question of just what a remake, replica, 
or repetition is on a number of different levels. For the most peculiar thing is that, having been 
given the utmost freedom to make this version, Leth’s third film is probably the least like the 
original when compared to the others.  
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Crux Scenica, Or Remaking the Gesture Cinematically 
In conclusion, we should say a little more about acting and Bergson’s most sustained 
engagement with theatrical performance and gesture – in his work, Le Rire, on laughter and 
the meaning of the comical. Previously, we noted that the actor playing the perfect human for 
the third remake in The Five Obstructions, Patrick Bauchau, was cast in part for his “well-
bruised” quality. He performs the “Man in Brussels” in a set of poses mute, his world-weary 
face doing a good deal of the acting for him. It is notable that early cinema acting, following 
its theatrical forebear, was hugely influenced by the tradition of mime and gesture, with both 
heroic and comical postures in acting characterised as deviations from the relaxed, erect, 
symmetrical pose, or ‘crux scenica’. David Mayer explains this in more detail as follows: 
 
To convey such an individual, the actor’s stance is the prescribed crux scenica: the 
relaxed body upright, arms similarly relaxed to gesture easily, knees slightly flexed, heels 
together, toes apart at a ninety-degree angle. This posture, which coincides with the 
development of ballet positions, we recognize as First Position. In any departure from a posture 
in which the body is always in control, denying or subduing all unruly and anti-social impulses, 
the actor begins to define character. Should the actor assume another stance, the audience, 
reading these signs, may make inferences about the character depicted. The crux scenica 
identified the man or woman of intellect and self-discipline. Self-control – a few key gestures 
and a virtual absence of multiple histrionic gestures – allowed an admirable person to survive 
intrigues without needing to reach for his sword or break her fan.41  
 
In the 1830s, the Parisian elocutionist François Delsarte codified a “gestural 
vocabulary” for the stage. Delsarte kept to this early eighteenth-century notion that any stance 
that deviated from the crux scenica could be read as a sign of (bad) character. This gestural 
acting, while not realistic by present-day standards, was nonetheless regarded at the time as 
verisimilar performance. Crucially, because absolute reality was deemed unknowable, acting 
Truth was more highly valued than a putative acting realism. As James Naremore relates, this 
is what theatre historians “now call the mimetic or “pantomime” tradition – a performance 
technique that relies on conventionalized poses to help the actor indicate “fear,” “sorrow,” 
“hope,” “confusion,” and so forth.” This was opposed to the position of “psychological 
realism” found in naturalism and later Method acting.42  
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Jean-Claude Schmitt has written about how the concept of attitude (modus habendi) is 
closely associated with that of figuratio. It results from the pausing of the movement that forms 
an ideal figure.43 Similarly, Elisabeth Engberg-Pedersen tells us that “differences in body 
posture link with emotionally different facial expressions to signal sequences of discourse with 
shifted attribution of expressive elements….”44 In many respects, then, from what we have 
already seen, Bergson also belongs to this tradition of physicalised attitude, only now displaced 
onto philosophy. When writing on attention, he showed how “stage by stage we shall be led on 
to define attention as an adaptation of the body rather than of the mind and to see in this attitude 
of consciousness mainly the consciousness of an attitude.”45 It is even arguable that this rich 
behaviourism of Bergson renders the problem of propositional attitudes (of beliefs) bodily, a 
matter of physical posture (attitudine). For as we saw, thinking itself is equally vectorised in a 
clearly behaviourist manner, albeit also being internalised as a tendency, “performed in the 
brain.” Here we have the aforementioned micro-behaviours of the brain alongside a macro-
behaviours of bodies. Any causal reduction (of brain by world or vice versa) would not be 
entailed, for the macro-posture would simply be the “externalised” translation of many micro-
postures, none of which are determining because each domain is equally real.  
Deviations from the crux scenica, we were told, often bore the physical weight of 
comedy – the clownish, animal distortions of the perfectly human posture – erect and in control. 
The comical both imitates and distorts what is deemed the norm. In the kinds of cinematic 
aping that we see in The Five Obstructions, each remake repeats and distorts the original 
(sometimes with comical results). As Paisley Livingstone noted, some of the remakes not only 
mimic their original (Leth’s The Perfect Human), but also create “a comical flaunting of Trier’s 
injunction” – cocking a snook at von Trier’s own attempts to “control” Leth’s artistic work.  
Such gestural derision also resonates with Bergson’s theory of comedy in Le Rire. Here, he 
points to the comic potential in the connection between gesture and repetition: 
 
In a public speaker, for instance, we find that gesture vies with speech. Jealous of the 
latter, gesture closely dogs the speaker’s thought, demanding also to act as interpreter. 
[…] But I find that a certain movement of head or arm, a movement always the same, 
seems to return at regular intervals. If I notice it and it succeeds in diverting my 
attention, if I wait for it to occur and it occurs when I expect it, then involuntarily I 
laugh. Why? Because I now have before me a machine that works automatically.  
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This admonition in laughter is part of the social caution that Bergson finds operating at the 
heart of humour – the need to control those who deviate from life’s proper function (to create, 
to be novel) – those who allow the mechanical to encrust itself upon the living (through habit, 
distraction, interference): “this is no longer life, it is automatism established in life and 
imitating it. It belongs to the comic.”46  Yet what is notable here is that the perception of 
repetition, through gesture, results in “involuntarily” laughter amongst those condemning it. 
The automatism is infectious. 
Yet it is not only repetition, but an excess of similarity that leads to further humour. 
Bergson links this notion to a related problem found in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées: 
 
This seems to me the solution of the little riddle propounded by Pascal in one passage 
of his Thoughts: “Two faces that are alike, although neither of them excites laughter by 
itself, make us laugh when together, on account of their likeness.” It might just as well 
be said: “The gestures of a public speaker, no one of which is laughable by itself, excite 
laughter by their repetition.” The truth is that a really living life should never repeat 
itself. Wherever there is repetition or complete similarity, we always suspect some 
mechanism at work behind the living. Analyse the impression you get from two faces 
that are too much alike, and you will find that you are thinking of two copies cast in the 
same mould, or two impressions of the same seal, or two reproductions of the same 
negative -- in a word, of some manufacturing process or other. This deflection of life 
towards the mechanical is here the real cause of laughter.47 
 
This excess of similarity creates a comical monstrosity. Hence, perhaps, one answer to the 
negative reception of Gus Van Sant’s replica of Psycho: the excess similarity is not only a 
repetition of crude audio-visual structure and story, but a monstrous, mechanical one lacking 
in the minimal vitality that would make a remake more than simply a repeition of form, but the 
regeneration, or reinvention, of an idea. The Five Obstructions document how one might repeat 
the gestures of a short film, but doing so without this becoming a mechanical gesture – and this 
occurs through Leth’s creative responses to von Trier’s obstructions. Each remake “reinvents” 
– to use Bergson’s term – the original, and thereby remakes not a story component or visual, 
but what was gestured, suggested, or directed, in the original. In true Bergsonian fashion, it is 
a movement – actual and bodily – rather than an ideal (Deleuzian virtual) that is realised. Van 
Sant takes full control his film by molding it on a fixed ideal (Hitchcock’s 1960 original) and 
yet in doing so, only makes his work all the more mechanical – or rather, exposes his own art 
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to the accusation of being an automatism, a predictable cliché. Even when Leth was given full 
“control” of the third remake, he did not revert to (his) “type” and utilise his normal long-take 
realist aesthetic – he invented a new style (itself composed of others’ clichés). By reinventing 
them for himself, however, he removed them from being simple formulae, just as his remake 
on The Perfect Human are never predictable.  
Bergson’s philosophy was once described as “an analysis against analysis”, and as such 
it could only suggest rather than demonstrate its truth.48 Accordingly, it is entirely true, as 
Bernard Gilson wrote, that each of Bergson’s books was “conceived at once as a scientific 
work and as a work of art.”49 Writing in 1965, Paul de Man put the nature of Bergson’s 
aesthetic in an even clearer light:  
 
The poetic image...becomes a close verbal approximation to what perception and 
sensation are actually like, much closer, at any rate, than the purely intellectual 
representation of reality found in the scientific concept.  Poetics thus becomes a vital 
source for theoretical psychology, rather than a minor part of it.50 
 
The poetic image is not an ornament but an aisthesis, which we see now as a matter of 
“attitude”, of “approximation”, and of “direction”: an imagery that embodies (gestures) 
suggestion, at least when it comes to communicating an intuition to another mind. Such 
posturing or “posing” is a much cinematic, however, as it is philosophical.  
Despite Bergson’s ambivalent relationship with the cinematic apparatus (as a device of 
capture and projection), we need not turn to Deleuze’s monstrous reading to redeem it. That 
rendering inflates the virtual into (unBergsonian) ontology and so pays too high a price (while 
also replacing a critique of capture with a commendation of editing): we can instead retain the 
processual and anti-Platonist dimension of Bergson’s thought, and render it cinematic, but only 
by focusing on the important place of the actual body – of gesture, attitude, and suggestion – 
in Bergsonism. Indeed, it is the cinematic Bergson that exposes the postural aspect of cinema 
and shows how one “idea” can be remade again and again and yet also be novel – through 
reinvention. 
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